International relations scholars increasingly conduct case study analysis using primary documents and archival research rather than relying solely on secondary sources. 1 "Primary sources are essential," as Deborah Larson argues, to produce "ªne grained decision-making analyses" that mitigate the biases of hindsight and uncritical dependence on existing scholarly works; assess causal mechanisms, counterfactuals, and alternative arguments; and account for a complex array of variables, including psychological and organizational factors in foreign policy. 2 Documentary evidence now features on both sides of important debates in which the persuasiveness of contending theories hinges on the assessment of speciªc historical cases.
by which some primary sources but not others make it into the debate to be analyzed. Building on work by Cameron Thies and Ian Lustick, 7 I consider the selection processes that restrict and categorize the sample of documents observed and cited by the researcher. In addition, I discuss sources of bias, and recommendations for improved effectiveness, in developing strategies for inference from a necessarily limited body of primary documents.
To showcase the promise and limitations of research with primary documents in security studies, I turn to the scholarly debate over President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and the U.S. entry into World War II (henceforth, the 1941 debate). This is a particularly rich and rewarding set of texts for students of international security and qualitative research methods, for four reasons. First, the debate features cogent yet starkly divergent historical claims. Did FDR intentionally provoke Japan and Germany in the months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, or not, and did his policy accord with or circumvent American public opinion? A "deception" argument (developed in Marc Trachtenberg's book The Craft of International History, advanced by John Schuessler in International Security and in his book Deceit on the Road to War, and deepened further by Trachtenberg in H-Diplo) suggests that FDR covertly escalated hostility with Japan and Germany before Pearl Harbor to produce American public support for a war he saw as inevitable and necessary. 8 A "democracy" counterargument, articulated most thoroughly by Dan Reiter in Security Studies, maintains that FDR downplayed potential crises in the Atlantic, pursued deterrence in the Paciªc, and conªned U.S. foreign policy within limits set by public opinion. 9 Second, the 1941 debate speaks directly to a major theoretical divide in the ªeld of international relations between core strands of realism and liberalism regarding the impact of democratic institutions and public opinion on foreign policy and the causes and outcomes of war. 10 If a U.S. president could manipulate or bypass public opposition in provoking or hurrying entry of the United States into a major war, and could survive politically, then this would deal a signiªcant blow to democratic (and American) exceptionalism and would provide strong support for the international relations realist worldview. Although one case will not resolve one of the foundational debates in international relations scholarship, much is clearly at stake.
Third, FDR's presidency is a particularly valuable case for examining infer- . Many authors claim that consolidated liberal democracies face domestic constraints on foreign policy decisionmaking, especially through public opinion. These constraints may be beneªcial by keeping democracies from ªghting one another and from involvement in unnecessary or unwinnable wars; by helping mobilize to win the wars that must be fought; by making governments' threats more credible and bargaining more effective (because leaders face "audience costs" imposed by the public's ability to punish poor decisions by removing leaders from ofªce); and by enhancing policy deliberation and learning through a marketplace of ideas. In contrast, several authors maintain that democracies behave like other states, especially in situations of acute threat, and that leaders rarely pay audience costs in practice and can circumvent or restructure the "marketplace of ideas." See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis," Security Studies, Vol. 21 ence and evidence in security studies because of Roosevelt's enigmatic leadership style, compounded by the absence of presidential diaries and memoirs. When presidents provide ostensibly authoritative collections of their own words, one might feel conªdent (perhaps, overconªdent) that one has direct access to their objectives and motivations. With FDR, though, biographers acknowledge confronting an unavoidable problem of uncertainty. 11 This analytical challenge should discipline scholars of FDR's foreign policy to argue inferentially and to reºect on the logic of our claims and evidence, developing best practices that can be applied even in seemingly more straightforward cases. Fourth, as the 1941 debate has progressed, it has leaned increasingly on primary sources. Now that both sides of the debate have cited extensive historical scholarship, several published primary sources, and archival documents, how can readers determine which account is superior? Close examination of qualitative research in practice, juxtaposed with prevailing methodological guidance and templates, places the substantive debate in methodological perspective and highlights areas for improvement on both sides. As researchers track causal arguments through the bramble of primary sources, their analyses will remain unpersuasive, and debates irresolvable, without clearer guidelines for evidence selection and inference. Existing methods literature in political science and history, however, has not fully developed the tools to correct the problem. This article elaborates a set of practices for social science research with archival and published primary evidence, both on FDR's foreign policy and, more broadly, in security studies.
In the ªrst section, I discuss the role of causal and descriptive inference in political science, the contributions and limitations of current qualitative methods techniques to strengthen inferences in documentary research, and the distinctions between history and political science with respect to inference from textual sources. Second, I critique the selection of primary sources in the arti- cles and chapters that form the 1941 debate. Third, I discuss several concrete proposals to replicate and extend this research and advance the debate. Fourth, to place the political science corpus on Roosevelt's foreign policy in cross-disciplinary perspective, I consider the far more extensive documentary research employed in two landmark historical monographs, and I argue that future increases in the availability of documents offer little prospect for resolving scholars' empirical debates-whether over historical cases such as World War II or more recent controversies such as the 2003 Iraq War-without clearer standards of evidence and inference. Fifth, to help develop these standards, I suggest eight guidelines for improving inference, transparency and replicability, and analytical leverage with primary documents for hypothesis testing. Sixth, to illustrate these recommendations and help break the logjam over FDR's foreign policy, I conduct a targeted replication analysis of a subset of documents that both sides of the debate identify as critical evidence. I conclude by reviewing the lessons of the 1941 debate for security studies scholarship, emphasizing the value and promise of further archival research in international relations, and summarizing my suggestions for how to conduct this work more effectively.
Approaches to Inference
Inference is central to political science research methods. As Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba explain, no causal relationship can be proven deªnitively in the social world, merely supported through a series of inferential tests; proceeding indirectly, scholars "[use] the facts we know to learn about the facts we do not know," both for description and for explanation. 12 Thus, researchers remain skeptical, not only subjecting our arguments to hard tests but also continually engaging rival explanations and alternative causal factors. 13 Quantitative and qualitative political scientists address this problem in different ways, and historians offer an alternative template. The arguments we make about cases depend, however, on the evidence we can draw from our sources: there are multiple stages of inference in any case study, and some of these have clearer methodological guidance than others.
Scholarship on causal inference is largely quantitative and employs an understanding of causation based on the laboratory experiment, comparing effects across groups of cases. In an experimental setting, researchers are able to randomly assign subjects (or cases) to a treatment or a control group, making it relatively straightforward to interpret a correlation between treatment and outcome as a sign of causal impact. When working with existing observational data, though, it is usually problematic to employ statistical models that assume random assignment. Even if we control for variables that might have an independent effect, other factors (known as "confounders") could inºuence the relationship between our hypothesized causal variable and the outcome of interest, producing a correlation that would erroneously suggest causation. Recent work has developed several tools for causal inference to correct for these problems, by focusing on comparing treatment effects across data points that are as similar as possible with respect to many contextual factors. 14 Qualitative researchers have likewise developed tools for more effective case selection for cross-case causal inference. 15 The predominant approach to causation in qualitative work, however, is based on process tracing to investigate causal mechanisms (and claims about the necessity or sufªciency of causal factors) in individual cases rather than "average effects" across a population. 16 Process tracing may face the steep challenge of a "continuity criterion": uninterrupted observation of a causal mechanism and explanation of "all the intervening steps in a case," the "intervening dominoes" as well as those at the beginning and end of a row, rather than a looser series of congruence tests or causal process observations within a case. 17 Even if the continuity standard is relaxed, using "causal process observations" at all still suggests that the evidence offers straightforward access to mechanisms, particularly when a "smoking gun" is uncovered, even if many other data are unavailable. 18 Conversely, scholars in the Bayesian tradition have argued that observations in process tracing are usually indirect and qualiªed, involving the accumulation of inferential "clues" with varying degrees of conªdence or probability. 19 Thus, relatively formalized inferential procedures in case study work, including counterfactual analysis as well as Bayesian updating, take on a heavy burden of evidence. Counterfactual work requires enough case data to suggest a plausible minor change and investigate its hypothetical consequences, and Bayesian work mandates assertions based on what the best available evidence shows relative to alternative possibilities. 20 How do we know if we have sufªciently powerful sources, enough of them, and what the preponderance indicates? Part of the solution involves acquiring stronger sources, and this informs qualitative scholars' turn to archival research, but we may be unduly conªdent about what we can learn simply from combining primary sources with process tracing.
Guidebooks on process tracing persuasively depict an inferential endeavor in which empirical tests and observations provide leverage on theoretical claims about causation in a case study. 21 But because each test is ultimately an assertion or judgment about what the evidence collectively shows, we need to examine a prior stage of inference, regarding source selection. Persuasive explanation depends not just on the quality, quantity, accuracy, or transparency of sources, but on their selection and their structural relationships to other potential sources of evidence relevant to inference bearing on the theoretical propositions. George and Bennett's row of dominoes is a useful metaphor for evidence on causal mechanisms, but it implies a monolithic concreteness of each observation that a limited sample from a fragmentary documentary record is hard-pressed to support. Even extensive exploration of primary and archival sources affords only limited windows into the policy process. Thus, not only are we likely to fall short of the continuity criterion for process tracing, but also any given causal process observation is going to be incomplete, contestable, and inferential. Nor is deception and bias the central problem, either from a document's author or its scholarly analyst. 22 Rather, the issue is descriptive inference from a sample of sources to a probative piece of evidence for or against a causal argument. 23 Each causal process observation, each falling domino, is a composite of descriptive inferences that ultimately enables causal inference at the level of the overall case. To make claims about the "uniqueness and certitude" of the ªt between theoretical prediction and docu- 23. Gerring, Social Science Methodology, p. 332, aptly notes that causal process observations (CPOs) are "sometimes more appropriately labeled as descriptive rather than causal." Dunning, Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences, pp. 208-230, explains how CPOs yield pieces of evidence on the presence or magnitude of particular variables or the operation of speciªc mechanisms. Beach and mentary evidence, 24 we might visualize instead a row of partially completed jigsaw puzzles and turn our attention to the structure of our sources.
Several scholars have raised concerns about source selection. As Lustick argues, rather than "the difªculty of ªnding necessary information," "[t]he more daunting question is how to choose sources of data without" stacking the deck in favor of our arguments. 25 Andrew Moravcsik observes a ªeld in "selfimposed crisis" because qualitative researchers lack "explicit methodological rules. . . . The selection, citation, and presentation of sources remain undisciplined and opaque"; some works might even "cherry-pick" sources to offer a misleading "patina of primary-source content." 26 Jack Snyder notes that because "[s]cholarly debates rarely hinge on smoking-gun evidence," persuasive research requires "a well-explicated theory, a systematic discussion of methodology, and a textual narrative that explains how diverse evidence combines to support an argument." 27 Addressing these concerns, scholars are developing and vigorously debating transparency initiatives, including innovations in expanded citations and online supplementary materials to facilitate replication. 28 Hyperlinked sources offer a check against misstating key passages; additionally, clarifying the rela- tionship between a quotation or paraphrase and the original helps readers assess whether the quote accurately reºects the text surrounding it, or whether it was taken out of context. 29 Between the document and the claim, however, lie further inferences involving the source's relationship to the theory, the source in the context of available sources, and the available materials relative to what the historical actors originally produced. Much of this evidentiary reasoning can be articulated in citations or appendices, or in the body of a manuscript, but we still need to know what to say-that is, how to specify the logic of source selection and inference. This article elucidates strategies for inference from source documents to individual observations, so that process tracing can connect the dots.
In developing these practices, to what extent should political scientists emulate historians in our selection and analysis of primary documents? After all, archival research is the lifeblood of history as a professional discipline. Moreover, history is a fundamentally inferential enterprise, and classic texts on historical methods emphasize the same points about uncertainty, skepticism, and extrapolation from evidence that political science does. 30 For instance, historians are excellent on the selection biases imposed by document survivability and intentional collection into archives, and thus on inference from the body of surviving documents to the original unobserved whole. 31 Historians tend to assume, however, that to make those inferences, scholars should tackle comprehensively the records that have survived. As a result, some historians suggest that archival work, for all its painstaking nature and serendipity, is ultimately fairly "simple" and "straightforward" 32 -ªgure out where the collections are, use the ªnding aids, and engage all the relevant sources. This perspective applies particularly to diplomatic historians relying primarily on national governments' central records. In contrast, social and cultural historians, and scholars of marginalized populations or authoritarian regimes, might argue that sources require more creative unearthing, and that existing collections must be read critically and against the grain. 33 The urge for comprehensiveness informs the recent wave of multinational, multiarchival research in diplomatic history, based on the understanding that U.S. foreign policy requires "de-centering" the United States and examining it "in the world" through other eyes. 34 Completeness is an impossible standard, and even if it were possible to explore all relevant archives and read all available records, this would not resolve every analytical dispute. Making claims about what the preponderance of the evidence supports, however, suggests a burden of consulting the bulk of relevant historical material, at least within some delimited scope.
For political scientists, who are interested in targeted rather than comprehensive searches, a second level of inference needs to be thought through, in the language of sampling. Here, historians may offer less help. Certainly, there are calls for more explicit attention to methodology in historical research: Marc Bloch, for instance, argues that "[e]very historical book worthy of the name ought to include a chapter, or if one prefers, a series of paragraphs inserted at turning points in the development, which might almost be entitled: 'How can I know what I am about to say?'" 35 This appears to be a minority position, however. John Lewis Gaddis explains that the "functional theory of historical veriªcation . . . is largely implicit"; the community of historians, borrowing from Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, will know good scholarship when they see it, so researchers "get on with doing history as best we can, leaving it to our readers to determine which of our interpretations come closest to the truth." 36 More bluntly, as Samuel Eliot Morison famously argued, "It matters little what 'method' the young historian follows, if he acquires the necessary tools of research, a sense of balance, and an overriding urge to get at the truth. Courses on historical methodology are not worth the time that they take up. . . . Historical methodology, as I see it, is a product of common sense applied to circumstances." 37 So how should political scientists proceed with the available sources, if we aspire to qualitative research with a degree of rigor? A more accurate distinction between political scientists and historians of international relations is not that the former pursue causal explanation and the latter emphasize interpretation or understanding, but rather that political scientists test and reªne relatively parsimonious theoretical models with historical data, whereas historians, albeit equally interested in explanation, tolerate greater complexity and even contradiction in their accounts. 38 The methodological implications of this theoretical divide have yet to be spelled out.
In particular, supporting or inªrming a relatively parsimonious hypothesis, while tolerating a lower degree of ªt between evidence and argument (i.e., more unexplained noise or variation), is a more limited aim than illuminating a historical episode. If historians consider a broad interplay of factors and even reciprocal causation, and if, though guided by questions, they welcome induction at least as much as deduction, then their pursuit of comprehensive exploration of the documentary record is understandable. For political scientists, reliance on a more limited evidentiary base is justiªable, but that base must be strategically selected, and its boundaries and trade-offs clariªed and defended to support inferences and claims. If "what I am not looking at and why" is not an issue on which political scientists can expect much help from historians, then we need to develop our own standards.
Sources and Scholarship on U.S. Entry into War in 1941
The 1941 debate among international relations scholars is fascinating from the standpoint of documentary sources and descriptive and causal inference. Political scientists employ primary and archival documents as evidence for competing explanations of a speciªc historical case with major theoretical implications. Trachtenberg and Schuessler argue that before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, FDR was more interventionist than the majority of the American public, and that his foreign policy toward Japan and his naval policy in the Atlantic involving Britain and Germany aimed to provoke a conºict that would convince the U.S. public to support entering World War II both in the Paciªc and in Europe. 39 If this thesis holds, it would suggest that democratic leaders, at least when facing major external threats, are relatively unconstrained by public opinion because they can circumvent and manipulate it. More broadly, this ªnding would undermine the idea that domestic regime type signiªcantly affects foreign policy behavior and the prospects for war and victory with particular kinds of adversaries. Conversely, Reiter argues that Roosevelt sought to deter rather than provoke Japan, to minimize rather than exacerbate naval confrontations in the Atlantic, and to persuade rather than deceive the American public (who, moreover, Reiter argues, already strongly supported more vigorous pressure on Japan and Germany despite the risk of war). 40 If Reiter's argument ªnds superior empirical support, it would suggest that the "marketplace of ideas" does function well in democracies; that leaders are closely constrained by public opinion; and that countries with different domestic political systems do have different prospects for war initiation and victory. No single case study will resolve paradigmatic disputes among international relations scholars such as the question of democratic exceptionalism, but the 1941 case is a core theoretical battleground, and a methodologically stimulating one.
The theoretical and empirical "architecture" of the "historical problem," as Trachtenberg calls it, has been laid out with exemplary clarity. 41 Reiter articulates six points of debate (three of which involved naval activity in the Atlantic) with exceptional focus in a single paragraph. 42 In a similar spirit, I identify three main areas of debate for the 1941 case: policy toward Japan, naval policy in the Atlantic, and the decisionmaking process in the Roosevelt administration. Linkages between these three are the crux of the "back door to war" thesis that FDR covertly provoked Japanese escalation to bring an otherwise reluctant United States into the war in Europe.
In Asia, where Japan had occupied Manchuria in 1931 and invaded eastern China in 1937, the United States supported nationalist Chinese resistance and worried that Japan might move further into Southeast Asia, particularly against Dutch Indonesia and its oil reserves. In 1941, the United States maintained diplomatic negotiations with Tokyo on these issues, before and after instituting an embargo on oil shipments to Japan. Two debates follow. First, was the embargo, particularly in FDR's view, designed to provoke or to coerce Japan, or to serve some other objective? Second, were U.S. negotiating efforts with Tokyo undertaken in good faith, or designed to provoke through unacceptable demands or to stall for time while the United States prepared for an inevitable war?
In what historians call the "Battle of the Atlantic," the United States ramped up support for a beleaguered Britain, which had suffered the "Blitz" of Nazi bombardment from September 1940 through May 1941, even as the Roosevelt administration publicly pledged to keep the United States out of the war. 43 Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease program in December 1940, and Congress approved it in March 1941. As the U.S. Navy began escorting supply convoys to Britain, naval encounters multiplied between U.S. vessels and German submarines, including an exchange of ªre between the USS Greer and a German U-boat in September, and U-boat sinkings of the USS Kearny and Reuben James in October. To coordinate this complex unofªcial alliance, FDR and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met aboard the USS Augusta at Argentia off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, in August; afterward, the two leaders announced the Atlantic Charter, a broad statement of shared values, war aims, and a liberal vision of postwar order. 44 Again, two core questions follow. First, what exactly did FDR say to Churchill at Argentia about U.S. intentions regarding war entry and naval policy in the Atlantic? Second, was FDR's Atlantic naval policy, particularly in practice, one of avoidance or provocation, of downplaying or brandishing incidents between U.S. and German vessels?
In Washington, the foreign policy process brought together FDR's domestic policy concerns, including the New Deal and continued recovery from the Great Depression, popular and congressional support and opposition (Roosevelt won an unprecedented third presidential term in November 1940), and bureaucratic cross-pressures, as well as a circle of advisers with their own personalities and rivalries. All of this, and not simply the chessboard of international strategy, may have affected policy decisions in the Paciªc and Atlantic theaters. Two questions are particularly salient. First, to what extent and in what way did public opinion considerations enter into FDR's decisionmaking with respect to the Atlantic and Japan? Second, which actors (societal, governmental, or foreign) had a relatively clear view of FDR's objectives and policies? Conversely, if there was deception by the Roosevelt administration, who was deceived? These, and similar questions, are core targets for new processtracing research with primary sources.
The architecture of the documentary record, however, is opaque. In addressing the empirical questions outlined above, Reiter, Schuessler, and Trachtenberg have fought to a standstill in their use of secondary sources (particularly, works by historians). For instance, on naval policy, Reiter cites Gerhard Weinberg's A World at Arms to argue that FDR ordered the navy to avoid incidents with Germany in the Atlantic. 45 46 Moreover, Weinberg's own source is a chapter in a German-language edited volume of proceedings from an academic conference. 47 Trachtenberg indicates that he read this chapter, by Jürgen Rohwer, "closely," interested in "what Rohwer's evidence actually showed," but he does not indicate what Rohwer's sources were. 48 Reiter cites Rohwer on Roosevelt's removal of a passage in WPL-51, a U.S. naval strategy document, that (in Reiter's words) "would have permitted British vessels to join American convoys and enjoy their protection." 49 Also unclear is each scholar's use of this German-language source (I do not read German). Rohwer's original chapter contains ten pages of maps of naval activity in the Atlantic and the Americas; the remaining thirteen pages employ numerous references and quotations (in German) from U.S. primary documents, but without notes or source locations. 50 The primary sources in question are neither speciªed nor consulted ªrsthand, at least according to the three scholars' citations.
Thankfully, the debate has progressed, and now incorporates primary sources, including archival documents, more extensively. Doing so produced another impasse, however: both sides present powerful quotations from several published and manuscript sources that contradict one another. The authors address various documents from different repositories without clarifying what else was examined or why they cited these ªles and not others. This approach to evidence readily establishes the plausibility of their competing arguments, but makes inference-and, for readers, adjudication of the debatemore difªcult. Trachtenberg's chapter in The Craft of International History, though citing a range of documentary sources, is primarily an illustrative methodological demonstration of "textual analysis" of scholarly sources in historiographical debates. 51 in international relations theory, and then relies almost exclusively on secondary sources (and primary sources quoted within scholarly monographs). Reiter analyzes several American and British primary sources, including archival documents from the FDR Presidential Library. Trachtenberg's H-Diplo paper musters an even greater range of documentary sources. Schuessler's Deceit on the Road to War updates his article and responds to Reiter's and Trachtenberg's articles; most signiªcantly from an evidentiary standpoint, it cites two additional primary sources. (An online appendix to this article compares each scholar's U.S. primary sources. 52 )
In sum, the 1941 debate has progressed from arguing about historians to arguing about historical documents, and as it evolved, scholars have produced a mass of footnotes to primary sources. What should readers make of this evolving body of research, and who presents the superior account? We could replicate directly as much as possible, checking quotations for error, misinterpretation, or worse. Even if all citations are accurate, however, the authors still disagree about fundamental empirical points regarding FDR's foreign policy, and all have quality sources. Stepping back to consider problems of inference, what types and locations of sources are being addressed and why these instead of others? Given the empirical questions under debate, are we looking for evidence in the most appropriate places?
Toward Replication and Extension
Deductively, where should scholars look to answer the core empirical questions in the 1941 debate? If we want to know what was said at Argentia, and we are citing the correspondence of some of the conference participants, what about the others? At least thirty individuals were present; the four Americans whose diaries Reiter, Schuessler, and Trachtenberg cite were not there. 53 Charles Beard, but not the political scientists, cites the memoirs of Elliott Roosevelt (FDR's son), who actually did participate. 54 FDR's declarations. 55 This evidence seems indirect at best. Similarly, to learn about U.S. naval policy in the Atlantic, how much information can we glean from State Department sources? And to debate a deception thesis, which sources would have participated in the conspiracy and which would have been its targets? Which lower-level ofªcials and allied leaders would have been privy to Roosevelt's mind? What can foreign (e.g., British) documents, even archival ones, reveal about contested points of Roosevelt's foreign policy?
Inductively, the sources cited in existing works suggest some potential discrepancies or omissions. 56 The partial use of the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series is particularly revealing about inferential problems in the 1941 debate. For some topics, FRUS might not be a natural source. For instance, on military policy such as naval procedures and deployments in the Atlantic, the State Department-even post facto, through its Ofªce of the Historian-might not be authoritative. Additionally, public opinion is not a traditional priority of diplomats and foreign ministries; even if FDR read polls closely, FRUS might not select documents on that topic for publication. For topics such as bilateral relationships between the United States and allies such as Britain or adversaries such as Japan, however, FRUS is an essential resource. No doubt this is why one of the few primary sources now cited by Trachtenberg, Reiter, and Schuessler is the two-volume FRUS collection Japan 1931-1941, published in 1943 (notably, during wartime). 57 This seems important for evidence on Roosevelt's policy toward that country, particularly on the goals of the oil embargo in the summer of 1941 and the objectives in preliminary peace talks and ultimatums that fall.
To what extent, however, does the corpus of documents in FRUS Japan 1931-1941 offer a comprehensive or representative evidentiary base for assessing that policy? There is an entire FRUS Far East volume (volume 4) for 1941 that Trachtenberg cited in The Craft of International History, but to which none of the subsequent works refer. 58 That volume has 729 pages on Japan, and was released in 1956. (The Japan 1931-1941 volume, as noted previously, appeared in 1943; some sensitive documents from 1941 might have been harder to release while the war was ongoing and FDR was still president.) Similarly, if Trachtenberg, quoting Paul Schroeder, suggests that "the war came about over China," 59 then scholars should examine FDR's China policy in volumes 4 (Far East) and 5 (also Far East, with a China emphasis). None of the works on 1941 by Reiter, Schuessler, and Trachtenberg cite volume 5, which contains 922 pages of documents, including 450 on the Japan-China undeclared war and 396 on Japanese southward expansion. 60 Moreover, the preface to the Japan 1931-1941 volume notes that the collection explicitly omits documents concerning U.S. relations with third parties bearing on Japan, to focus on the strictly bilateral agenda. 61 This suggests that China-Japan-U.S. triangulation might not be best served by this volume.
Moreover, because the back-door-to-war thesis emphasizes connections between the European and Asian theaters, scholars should explore overall foreign policy strategy in volume 1 of FRUS for 1941 (which Trachtenberg's H-Diplo paper alone cites) and regional volumes on Europe (volume 2, uncited by anyone) and the British Commonwealth (volume 3, also uncited). 62 The Soviet Union, France, and the Netherlands (in addition to Britain) had signiªcant Asian and European interests. We might at least look for "Japan" or "public opinion" in those volumes' indices. Conversely, the volume 4 index on the Far East suggests that many documents concern FDR-Churchill conversations and relations with other countries discussing Japan, with extensive British requests for coordination. 63 If FDR expressed to Churchill the idea of conºict with Japan as a "back door" to war with Germany, there is no particular reason to expect this comment to appear in a FRUS volume on Japan, as opposed to the Far East, Britain, or overall foreign policy.
Further deductive puzzles arise from the promising but preliminary consultation of the FDR Presidential Library archives. If political scientists want to explore FDR Library sources, which speciªc collections are the most valuable? Combined, Reiter, Schuessler, and Trachtenberg have cited documents from boxes 4, 55, 62, and 80 of the FDR Library's President's Secretary's File (PSF) series, which is available, in its entirety, online. 64 That is, 4 boxes out of 174 in the series (the PSF contains up to 260,000 pages). 65 Why these 4? Are the others irrelevant? Hardly. Robert Dallek, for instance, cites material from about 24 boxes-even if these had been chosen at random (which they surely were not), that sample would still comprise more than 13 percent of the total. The series' contents list suggests additional relevant material. Box 43 has folders on Japan; many of these documents (according to notes on images of individual pages) were published in FRUS (some in Japan 1931-1941 and some in 1941 volume 4 on the Far East) or in the Pearl Harbor hearings; a few appeared in both, and some in neither. 66 If nothing else, this scattered distribution of primary material for publication tells us how partial a picture of U.S.-Japan relations we obtain by examining only one printed source. Box 22 contains bound dispatches from Ambassador Joseph Grew in Japan; these are not listed as published in FRUS or elsewhere. 67 look at the numerous boxes on the Navy, the War Department, and the administrators of each; for the Argentia summit and relations with Britain, several British leaders have their own subject ªles. 68 Moreover, the PSF is one of eleven series from FDR's papers as president available at the FDR Library, and hardly the largest. The nine smallest seriesincluding the PSF-amount to 343 linear feet. 69 The two largest collections, the Ofªcial File (OF) and the President's Personal File, contain 1,174 and 608 linear feet, respectively, totaling about 3.5 million pages. 70 Neither series has been digitized, but both are clearly important to historians doing serious archival work on Roosevelt's foreign policy. 71 The FDR Library maintains lengthy online ªnding aids and container lists for each. 72 As one example of a potential search site based on container titles, OF 18 (Department of the Navy) boxes 17-18 include summer 1941 material for and against ªring Navy Secretary Frank Knox. 73 To assess FDR's naval policy, especially if scholars have already cited communications involving Knox, this might be important.
If political scientists have turned to primary sources, and particularly archives, to answer important historical debates on which major theoretical disputes depend, why is it that the sources cited are generally few, scattered, and easily electronically retrievable? Pending answers to questions such as these, readers may have a hard time taking sides in the 1941 debate over FDR's foreign policy. 
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What Would Historians Do?
In contrast to the scholarship discussed above and to common practice in political science, historians of FDR's foreign policy generally aim at exhaustive exploration of the best available sources. 74 From the standpoint of documentary support for historical and theoretical arguments, it is particularly instructive to compare political scientists' sources with those employed in two historical monographs, decades apart: Charles Beard's provocative volume, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, and Robert Dallek's Bancroft Prize-winning book, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932 Policy, -1945 . A large number of high-quality sources does not automatically produce superior analysis-Beard's book, which presented a revisionist argument that the Roosevelt administration stealthily maneuvered the United States toward war before the Pearl Harbor attack, has long been roundly criticized for its framing and interpretation of evidence. Therefore, this is not an exhortation for political scientists simply to increase our citations or time in the archives, particularly because, as I have argued, we generally have different research objectives than historians. The asymmetry of sources between works of political science and history on the same events is sobering, however, and requires reºection. Even excellent process-tracing research is generally not emulating historians' practices: its use of sources is far more selective. Partial exploration of the historical record is defensible, even laudable for certain analytical purposes, but only if such selection is both transparent and strategic.
The works under discussion by Schuessler, Trachtenberg, and Reiter distance themselves from Beard's book as if it were a polemic devoid of serious evidence. 75 Schuessler calls the Beard volume part of a "ªrst wave of revisionist scholarship" that advanced a "plausible" thesis about Roosevelt pushing an unwilling and unaware United States into war. 76 So what, really, was the problem with Beard's book? In mid-century broadsides, historian Samuel Eliot Morison critiqued not merely Beard's "innuendo" and errors, but also his selection of documents, and thereby his "frame of reference" method of analysis. 80 Morison claimed, "Without misstating many facts or garbling quotations . . . Beard, by ingenious arrangement and selection, ruthless rejection of attendant circumstances, and a liberal use of innuendo, compiled a powerful brief for the thesis that Franklin D. Roosevelt was the aggressor against Germany and Japan." 81 Morison recognized that partial selection is inevitable, but argued that the goals should be an accurate representation of what happened, a "sense of balance" despite the impossibility of purely objective analysis, and eternal "skepticism" about the "preconceptions" that affect scholars' "selection and arrangement of facts." 82 If Morison is right that the central failing of Beard's explanation of FDR's foreign policy lies not in misrepresenting documents, but in cherry-picking them to undermine accurate inference, then despite marshaling ever more documents to support a thesis, political scientists will make little progress in inference until we improve and clarify our own selection procedures.
Beard, writing in the 1940s, actually drew on the best repository of primary documents available at the time: those obtained from various corners of the executive branch and published as "exhibits" by the 1945-46 congressional committee of inquiry into the Pearl Harbor attack. 85 According to Beard, because FDR's 1941 press conferences had not yet been published and he could not gain access at Hyde Park (the nascent FDR Library), he obtained access to a newspaper's stenographic notes, including off-the-record statements by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. 86 And when Beard found published references to documents that he did not possess, he explained that he had tried to obtain the originals: reading about a press release for which he could ªnd no newspaper account, he requested the source from the State Department, but was told that no such document existed. 87 In taking these steps, Beard repeatedly offered his rationales for inference and interpretation by contrasting two sets of documents, or two versions of the same document or event. 88 initial ofªcial narrative and the subsequently released version of the same events or documents. 90 Scholars can criticize Beard's use or abuse of these materials, and we can engage more recently released documents to which he did not have access, but we ought at a minimum to engage the declassiªed sources with which he grappled so extensively.
Let us fast-forward to Dallek's monograph, which Trachtenberg, Schuessler, and Reiter all cite repeatedly and enthusiastically. Trachtenberg calls it "the most important book on Roosevelt's foreign policy" and cites it thirteen times in chapter 4 of The Craft of International History. 91 Schuessler calls Dallek's book "the most comprehensive account of Roosevelt's foreign policy" and cites it (or quotations reproduced therein) more than a dozen times. 92 In a letter in International Security, Reiter cites Dallek in a quarter of the footnotes; in his Security Studies article, Reiter cites Dallek ten times out of 132 footnotes. 93 The period of major debate-1941-largely falls within chapter 11 of Dallek's book. Within that one chapter, Dallek cites more primary sources than do the works under discussion by Reiter, Schuessler, and Trachtenberg put together-not that quantity alone should persuade. From the President's Secretary's File series of the FDR Library alone, in chapter 11 alone, Dallek cites documents from twenty-three separate subject entries, some of which span multiple boxes. 94 For instance, the PSF has material on public opinion polls, enabling Dallek to comment on unpublished polls commissioned by the government, as well as on FDR's and his aides' reactions to those polls. This has tremendous inferential value for the 1941 debate, but none of the political science authors have cited these documents, even though they are available online.
Because of historians' dedication to comprehensive exploration of the body of available records, and their sensitivity to its limitations, they understandably anticipate potential revelations from future waves of declassiªed documents. In 1948, Beard looked forward to the eventual opening of FDR's personal papers, the public release of captured Japanese documents, and the opening of other U.S. and foreign archives, without all of which many of the core questions about Roosevelt's foreign policy "must remain for the pres- ent a matter of conjecture." 95 In a similar spirit, Schuessler and Reiter seem to agree that future declassiªcation will help resolve their dispute over the role of presidential deception in the 2003 Iraq War. 96 For historians, but even more acutely for political scientists, additional tranches of potential evidence provide diminishing returns to understanding, and even complete access to the archives would not settle all debates. Six decades after the end of World War II, Trachtenberg observed that historians still "[ªnd] it hard to nail down, in any conclusive way, exactly what FDR's policy was"; this point "implies that the absence of hard, 'smoking gun'-type evidence does not necessarily mean that much, and that in interpreting Roosevelt's policy one has to place greater emphasis on indirect reasoning than one would perhaps like." 97 Hence Schuessler's frank admission of offering a "circumstantial" case, noting that "[a]dmittedly, some uncertainty about Roosevelt's intentions is irreducible." 98 If we cannot resolve the 1941 debate now, even with the massive and highlevel documentation currently available, what are our prospects for assessing the 2003 debate at an equal distance into the future? Because political scientists are generally not emulating historians' drive for comprehensiveness, we should temper our optimism regarding the proliferation of sources, and we should turn our attention to sharpening our research strategies. For "circumstantial" or "indirect," let us read "inferential," and strive to make it so.
Guidelines for Dealing with Documents
How then can political scientists most effectively approach the sources we have? The existing approach in political science is to read some primary sources and cite them as evidence. The historians' approach is to read as much as possible and then cite evidence. In between, political scientists interested in establishing a strong evidentiary foundation for causal inference should try to specify what to read and cite, and what not to, as a strategic selection, and International Security 42:3 110 to explain their rationale for these decisions as part of a research design. To support this endeavor, I suggest eight guidelines for improved inference in research with primary documents, including in the archives. I also derive further proposals for new, targeted research on FDR's foreign policy. The ªrst three points concern transparency and replicability, clarifying the inference for readers to follow and assess.
First, scholars should specify which archival series, boxes, and folders we examined during our research (not just those eventually cited), not merely which archives or vast series or record groups (too broad for most types of inference) or which documents (too narrow for inference). Likewise with published documents-which volumes of FRUS were consulted for which issues, for instance. The goal is not to impress with quantity or to lead future scholars into blind alleys of irrelevant material. In fact it is the opposite: identifying unhelpful boxes saves future scholars effort, helps them target sources not yet consulted, and makes their work more compelling if they uncover damning evidence that we overlooked or omitted. Clarifying the relationship between our argument and search strategy might also yield important null ªndings where a subject surprisingly went unmentioned in the records of a particular ofªce or decisionmaker. Veteran scholars who have explored hundreds of containers of material might understandably question the practicality of a comprehensively detailed list. It seems reasonable, however, to ask scholars to outline with some precision where they chose to search for evidence, and what they found. Intriguingly titled but ultimately unhelpful archival boxes could usefully be summarized in a brief line about the hunch that led the scholar to those ªles and why that material is not cited in the narrative, thus clarifying the research process and augmenting its persuasiveness.
Second, citations should specify the location (series, box, folder, hard copy or online) of the document, not simply what it was-the same diplomatic cable matters differently for inference depending on its larger documentary context. 99 Several copies of a document may be available in FRUS and other publications, or in the archival records of different ofªces or individual decisionmakers; and where a document resides, not merely what it says, can be signiªcant. This point goes double for documents consulted online, includ-
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99. Particular archives' speciªc format recommendations can also be accommodated, for example by citing a physical call location rather than a series box number.
ing on the website of the archive that maintains the original, or in a printed or third-party collection (e.g., the National Security Archive). No citation should omit explicit mention that a document was read electronically (in which case scholars should provide a hyperlink), which would misleadingly imply that archival research had been undertaken on the ground. (This guideline is not simply an issue of deception or transparency, but again speaks to inference, establishing the relevant population of documents from which a scholar sampled.) Such citation detail is common practice, but it is also frequently violated in political science, so it bears emphasis. 100 Third, either for an overall case study, or for particular empirical points, scholars should articulate the inferential rationale for selecting the sources examined and cited as opposed to others. If we look at only one folder in a box, box in a series, series in an archive, section of a volume, or volume in a series, why? For instance, citing documents solely by their box or volume number, if they were uncovered through a selective but unspeciªed process such as electronic keyword search or an index entry, misleads by implying that the author reviewed the rest of the material, of which the quoted sample is representative. Similarly, even if we read a document in the original but had searched for it directly after following another scholar's citation, we need to clarify this route and establish what documentary context we have also read. Search terms may also induce selection bias: looking for an individual will enhance his or her prominence, and a search for particular crises will ªnd them, whereas a search for peace overtures would uncover those instead. Scholars are responsible for ensuring that cited material faithfully represents the context from which it was selected, which implies the need to review and report surrounding material within a particular scope. 101 Because political scientists are generally employing partial rather than exhaustive documentary investigations to test hypotheses, that scope may be fairly narrow, but it needs to be delimited and justiªed.
Another three suggestions help establish such inferential rationales based on research design. To analyze a historical case through primary documents, which bodies of text will be explored and why? We are not testing a hypothesis with a case in toto, or a particular document, but with a sample of documents.
Therefore, we should frame implications of hypotheses that point toward some sources or collections over others. In turn, it should be possible to assess the inferential basis and prima facie persuasiveness of a particular study even before looking at the content and authority of the quotations, by looking at from whence these came. Which sets of documents should provide evidence on competing propositions about, for example, Roosevelt's preferences regarding Japan in 1941?
The fourth suggestion, then, is to search where other scholars have already worked, the ªles established as bearing the best evidence on the contested points. If we already cite Dallek or Wilson on Argentia, then follow the lead of their footnotes. Similarly, we might also rely on guidance from archivists, taking expert directions that likely cued other researchers as well. Either way, we should explain this strategy, with citation, for transparency. This approach might be particularly effective in the early stages of a large research project, and it is essential in replication analysis. It is also important for revisionist arguments, because countering a prominent scholarly work or predominant consensus in the ªeld based on texts already admitted into evidence is a powerful rebuttal. Debates on the drivers of European integration illustrate this approach, proceeding not primarily by the constant interjection of new material, but rather by critiquing competitors' use of a mutually agreed-upon, manageably sized corpus of documents. 102 Conversely, omitting these documents might look like avoiding evidence against one's argument. To defeat a "deception" argument, what do we make of the Pearl Harbor Hearings ªles, on which Beard relies so heavily?
Fifth, scholars could try the reverse approach: explicitly seek out new evidence, previously uncited. Explore on a hunch, in series or repositories where predecessors have not-but with a clear rationale for what one hopes to ªnd and why. We might target overlooked material-Eleanor Roosevelt's papers, perhaps, for private references to her husband's objectives. Or we might focus on newly released material, assessing whether ªndings based on these documents contradict those employing previously available, perhaps less highly classiªed ones. Prominent examples of this strategy (which, like the previous approach, seems useful for revisionism) include works by Fred Greenstein, John Lewis Gaddis, and Caitlin Talmadge. 103 This approach also facilitates triangulation across document repositories and types of evidence (including multi-archival research), which is increasingly common in international and diplomatic history and is a touchstone of mixed-method work in political science. 104 Done transparently and strategically, such work should contribute both to cumulativity of knowledge and to inference, akin to digging in separate squares of an archaeologist's grid. If the evidence in one set of papers supports one theory, whereas a second trove of documents undermines the argument, we are in a position to assess which repository should be treated as more authoritative, or to discuss the selection effects that produced this variation. Without a clear logic of source selection, however, triangulation can simply proliferate rather than resolving inferential problems, by expanding the population of sources from which a scholar is sampling. 105 Sixth, rather than new materials or unexplored old ones, we might map out the structure of existing documentation and search for evidence more systematically based on our knowledge of decisionmaking processes, historical context, and relevant hypotheses. For instance, on Argentia we might consult only the ªles of individuals actually present, or we might focus on military docu-International Security 42:3 114 ments rather than State Department sources to determine Atlantic naval procedure. For cabinet ofªcials' roles in White House policy, their papers at the relevant presidential library might be the best repository, while the workings of departments (including cabinet members' interactions with subordinates) are better tracked in those organizations' ªles at the National Archives. Secondary sources and newspapers could also help us account for other factors in decisionmakers' situational awareness, for instance by stated positions in documents before and after salient events such as FDR's reelection or Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. 106 As with Frank Schimmelfennig's suggestion of "efªcient" process tracing by analyzing selected parts of a causal chain, this strategy would target portions of the documentary record estimated to have the greatest theoretical relevance or empirical payoff. 107 Archival ªnding aids and indices to published volumes of documents are invaluable for targeting, transparently and efªciently, particular actors, subjects, and time periods within a case. 108 Deduction and design may, in many cases, replace a great deal of less focused textual research.
Two ªnal suggestions aim to bolster inference based on individual documents. We should pursue these most aggressively for documents that support our argument, and those not already contextualized through the research design points above. The temptation is to explain away documents that point against us, and this can often be readily done given the mass of available documentation. Seventh, then, because a given document is usually insufªcient to trace a causal process, clarify for which part of a causal argument it is serving as evidence: one text should not be used simultaneously to measure an independent variable, a dependent variable, and a causal mechanism. For instance, a source might indicate the degree of aggressiveness in U.S. naval policy toward Germany (dependent variable), FDR's objectives regarding Germany (independent variable 1), the public's desires regarding Germany (independent variable 2), or the inºuence of public opinion on FDR's decisionmaking (mechanism), but it cannot realistically bear the weight of process tracing to connect sign over criticism (and perceived slights) he had received from FDR in the interim. 115 Inferences about Ickes' and FDR's policy positions will be stronger if we examine the cited letters in the context of their chain of communications.
There are reasons to doubt, however, whether Ickes' correspondence is really the best source of evidence for any aspect of the 117 These points could be reversed and used explicitly as research strategies. If historians have overlooked Ickes' papers, then perhaps political scientists are exploring new areas. And if the Interior Department received the same policy guidance as the Department of the Navy, then this might be strong evidence against a compartmentalized conspiracy to maneuver the United States into war despite public opinion. A close reading of this folder suggests three main observations that undermine the deception argument and call into question the evidentiary value of Ickes' papers for analyses of FDR's foreign policy.
First, the Ickes-FDR correspondence in the week following the June 23 backdoor letter indicates that Ickes' ideas fell outside the mainstream and that he himself stood outside the foreign policy process. FDR replied tersely, asking whether Ickes' call for an oil embargo on Japan "would continue to be your judgment if this were to tip the delicate scales and cause Japan to decide either Japanese were arguing internally, Roosevelt explained, over "which way they are going to jump," against Russia or toward Indonesia, or "whether they will sit on the fence and be more friendly with us. No one knows what the decision will be but, as you know, it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Paciªc." 122 These remarks undercut the back-door argument by hoping for peace in the Paciªc and estimating that it might be possible. These are the ªnal comments on Japan in this folder before the July 26 U.S. freeze of Japanese assets, so if Ickes was pushing for escalation with Japan, he apparently did not persuade FDR.
Second, although Ickes consistently displayed a conspiratorial mind-set, he focused not on manipulating foreign adversaries or domestic opinion but rather on uncovering bureaucratic plots against his own position. Alternately paranoid and petulant, Ickes framed perceived threats to himself as assaults on the president's authority, and he employed ºattery and emotional manipulation to put FDR on his side in bureaucratic squabbles. When the Navy Department planned to park 5,000 cars indeªnitely on the polo ªeld on the National Mall, which as federal land fell under the purview of the Interior Department, Ickes complained of exclusion from the decision, predicted that "[t]his demand of the Navy will doubtless be followed by others," and warned that "[i]t is fortunate that the parks are nearer to the Navy building than the White House or he might choose to use the grounds there." 123 Ickes expressed alarm that the State Department was supposedly planning to create a Caribbean Division incorporating not just foreign countries but also Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which as U.S. territories fell under Ickes' Interior Department. Based on "several months" of "reports from various sources," Ickes argued that "the evidence is clear" that the State Department was "planning a surprise raid" while having "done all that it could to prevent any information of its doings from reaching me." 124 He protested moves by the Ofªce of Production Management (OPM) and Vice Chairman of the National Power Policy Committee Leland Olds as "attempting to usurp" his own power as NPPC Chairman and darkly wondered whether Olds and his compatriots were "shortcutting you, as they have been shortcutting this Department for International Security 42:3 120 122. FDR-Ickes, July 1, 1941, folder "Interior-Ickes, Harold L., 1941," box 55, PSF FDRL. 123. Ickes-FDR, February 13, 1941, folder "Interior-Ickes, Harold L., 1941," box 55, PSF FDRL. 124. Ickes-FDR, June 2, 1941, folder "Interior-Ickes, Harold L., 1941," box 55, PSF FDRL. many months?" 125 Ickes complained about Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones and OPM planning magnesium plants in Nevada without Interior Department oversight, explaining that he had "suspected" their collusion "[f]or some time" and warning of "a scandal at the end of this Administration" and of having "troubles enough now without wanting to lock horns with the most powerful man in the Administration barring only yourself." 126 Ickes sought FDR's support in transferring the Forest Service from the Agriculture Department to Interior, anticipating resistance from Agriculture Undersecretary Paul Appleby, who "knows how to give lip service while sabotaging effectively," and the Forest Service, whose leaders "pretend to obey the orders of the Chief Executive . . . you have had experience with insubordination in this quarter in the past." 127 And when the White House reprimanded Ickes over alleged press leaks from the Interior Department regarding oil for Japan, Ickes hotly denied the accusation, which, he told FDR, "does not make particularly pleasant reading"; he also complained of "getting pretty fed up with incorrect rumors," and argued that "I should have the name of your informant." 128 Third, Ickes' comments on foreign policy are out of step with FDR's thinking, out of touch with world affairs, and short on strategic calculation. His reports and positions involved a mix of comments from academic correspondents and long-held personal beliefs. In May 1941, Ickes forwarded a letter from a history professor proposing that FDR call for a world peace conference as an overture to Hitler, which, even if it failed, might make subsequent war entry more popular. 129 Peace overtures to Germany were far from FDR's intentions in the summer of 1941, though. Roosevelt instead considered calling a "congress or parliament of democratic countries," but Ickes replied that "now that Russia is with us, even if not of us, this could not be done without great embarrassment and, therefore, it should not be done at all." 130 Roosevelt remained committed to democracy as a foundation of international order, launching with Churchill the Atlantic Charter on August 14. On oil, Ickes fo-
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renewed his call for an oil embargo on Japan, linked this to public opinion ("as popular a move . . . as you could make"), and connected the public in turn to war entry in Europe: the embargo might "make it, not only possible but easy, to get into this war in an effective way." And yet, this is hardly conclusive evidence for the back-door thesis. First, Ickes suggested that this is a good moment to do something he had long advocated: cutting off oil to Japan. Second, he suggested that an embargo would not affect Japanese behavior, because "Japan is so preoccupied with what is happening in Russia . . . that she won't venture a hostile move against the Dutch East Indies." 135 The bottom line is that one of the few sets of documents mustered by both sides of the 1941 debate, when examined in detail and in context, breaks rather sharply against the deception thesis, while also revealing its own limitations as a source of evidence. Harold Ickes' letters do not disprove the deception thesis, but they do indicate that such a causal process did not run through the Interior Department, where Ickes was hardly a foreign policy mastermind. Overall, the documents do indicate a conspiratorial slant-not of the Roosevelt administration's foreign policy decisionmaking, but rather of Ickes' imagination. Future work should strategically target alternative sources that more effectively track key policymakers' engagement with public opinion, naval operations, and other empirical issues listed above. One targeted study cannot resolve the entire 1941 dispute, but it demonstrates the value of selecting source material with inference in mind.
Conclusion
Process tracing through archival research offers a potent method of foreign policy analysis. Primary documents can empower researchers to assess how decisionmakers weighed risks, options, and uncertainty; to follow the subtle currents of leader personality and ideology; and to contextualize and critique the lessons of the past for enduring and contemporary security challenges. What guidance do scholars have for conducting this research most effectively, and what standards should readers use to evaluate whether such work is persuasive? Qualitative research methods literature has ªrmly established the scientiªc role of case studies and enumerated best practices for process tracing.
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Separately, we have advice on conducting archival work and gathering and interpreting other primary and secondary sources. This article seeks to bridge these two themes, and to address emerging debates on research transparency. I argue that political scientists need to explain how our source selection yields the kinds of observations necessary for core descriptive and causal inferences at the case level. Exploring the terrain of documents is akin to conducting other forms of social science research, from ethnographic ªeldwork to survey experiments, in that we need a clear idea of where we are going (and where we have been) and why. Political scientists generally do not treat documentary material the way most historians would-as comprehensively as possible, to illuminate and understand particular episodes in context-but rather to gain leverage with which to explain case studies, test hypotheses, and assess and improve theories. Differing objectives imply different methods, but this requires political scientists to develop a new template for effective analysis. Ultimately, we need to be more reºective, transparent, and strategic about our selective use of available documentation.
To this end, I offered eight suggestions for improving qualitative research with documentary primary sources. Scholars should cite their sources in detail for replication, but we should also clarify the main directions of sources explored but not cited. More broadly, we need to articulate a research strategy, why we headed one direction rather than another in search of evidence. Strategies might include following where others have worked, breaking new ground elsewhere, or following our knowledge of the policy process to target particular sources. When we have relevant sources in hand, we should clarify their speciªc relationship to our overall claims about the causal process, and provide some robustness checks by probing the communicative context of key documents.
To demonstrate how document-driven case studies work in practice in security studies, and critique the limitations of our existing techniques and norms, I reviewed the exemplary security studies debate over Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy in the months before Pearl Harbor. Recent scholarship by Marc Trachtenberg, John Schuessler, and Dan Reiter has brought competing theories to bear on a signiªcant historical case. Did FDR escalate foreign conºicts and manipulate public opinion to bring the United States into World War II, or not? The deception question matters, both for theoretical arguments between realists and liberals in the ªeld of international relations, and for contemporary
